

Heavy Lift Launch for Lunar Exploration

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Lunar Transportation Requirements

- **> 50 tonnes on lunar transfer trajectory**
 - **Apollo: 40 tonnes @ TLI for 2 men, 3 days on lunar surface.**
 - **Unlikely to be reduced significantly; can miniaturize components but not crew.**
 - **Maybe less if lunar oxygen is used for return propellant.**
 - **Note: 50 tonnes @ TLI implies 100 tonnes in LEO for 450 sec I_{sp} LOX/LH₂ upper stage.**
 - **70 tonnes if 850 sec nuclear thermal upper stage, but not likely in foreseeable political environment.**
- **Land anywhere on the Moon.**
- **Go any time of the month.**
- **Abort to Earth at any time.**

Lunar Transportation System Architectures

- **Lunar Orbit Rendezvous (LOR)**
 - **Heritage from Apollo; “mother ship” waits in orbit while specialized lunar lander makes trip to surface. Avoids “cost” of fuel to carry robust Earth-return vehicle on entire round trip.**
 - **Probably minimum LEO mass for basic lunar round trip, but still many tens of tonnes for mission “critical mass”.**
 - **Can go twice every day.**
 - **Limited to low lunar latitudes w/o sacrificing abort-to-Earth.**
 - **Return vehicle left in lunar orbit represents inefficient use of mass in a developed transportation system.**
 - **Potentially lengthy storage times for return vehicle in lunar orbit will require low-efficiency space storable propellants, or new technology for long-term cryo storage.**
 - **Possible basis of future system if/when extensive lunar orbit infrastructure is ultimately developed.**

Transportation Architectures (cont.)

- **Earth Orbit Rendezvous (EOR)**
 - Required LEO mass is built up with multiple launches to rendezvous in Earth orbit.
 - Minimum launch can be a few tonnes to LEO, but many launches!
 - Perceived as a good match to space station infrastructure, but subtle issues result in significant operational problems.
 - Cryogenic fuel storage during build-up is challenging, particularly in event of missed launch window.
 - Limited launch windows; Earth-centered plane of “station” (or rendezvous) orbit *must* point to lunar targeting position at TLI.
 - Happens only once every 9 days for due-East 28.5° maximum performance orbit from Canaveral; less for 51.6° ISS orbit.
 - Less frequent windows if particular landing times must be selected (e.g., dawn) or avoided (e.g., midnight) at the Moon.
 - Similar constraints limit aborts if must also *return* to ISS.
 - Will become a “must” if multiple RLV payload modules are ultimately used to construct a lunar mission.

Transportation Architectures (cont.)

- **Lunar Surface Rendezvous (LSR)**
 - **Required lunar mass attained with one or more launches to desired point(s) on lunar surface. Single mission must carry all essentials. (“Direct Ascent” in Apollo days.)**
 - **Ultimately necessary to build any sort of lunar base.**
 - **Can go twice per day, land anywhere , come home any time.**
 - **Minimum manned mission requires many tens of tonnes to maintain robust abort (propellant, heat shield), even assuming pre-deployment of surface assets.**
 - **Less if lunar-derived propellants available for return trip.**
 - **Cargo missions can be much smaller if economically favored.**
 - **Unavoidable penalties for carrying heat shield to lunar surface.**
 - **Obviously usable in concert with other methods, at cost of additional constraints.**

Transportation Architectures (cont.)

- **Lagrange Point Rendezvous (LPR)**
 - **Build space infrastructure at stable Lagrange Points (L4, L5) instead of/in addition to LEO; deploy to/from Earth/Moon.**
 - **3 days from Earth, 2(?) days from Moon.**
 - **“Small” ΔV penalty for use of staging point.**
 - **Plenty of sunlight for power, plenty of shade for fuel storage.**
 - **Possibly best spot in cislunar space for “marshalling yard”.**
 - **Can come and go at any time to any place on either planetary surface.**
 - **Abort may not always be to Earth.**
 - **Potential problem in solar flare seasons.**
 - **Minimum manned mission from Earth still several tens of tonnes.**
 - **Probably more suitable for use as part of a well-developed cislunar infrastructure, rather than as an initial lunar return.**

Lunar Transportation Costs

- Benchmarks**

Vehicle	Cost(\$97)	LEO Payload (kg)	Cost/kg
Saturn V	\$600 M*	140,000	4,300
Shuttle	\$500 M**	23,000	22,000
Titan IV	\$300 M	16,000	18,000
Atlas II-AS	\$130 M	8,600	15,000
Delta 7920	\$50 M	5,000	10,000

- Goals**

RLV	\$20 M	10,000	2,000
Magnum	\$160 M	80,000	2,000

* \cong \$100 M FY70\$ for launch vehicle (\$300 M for full Apollo mission).

** Very difficult to determine accurately; minimum \$3 B to support a nominal 6 launches/year.

Transportation Architecture Summary


- **All modes except EOR require a minimum manned mission of several tens of tonnes to TLI.**
- **EOR imposes numerous scheduling and operational constraints, and eliminates the economies of scale which are possible with larger payload envelopes.**
- **Robust lunar base development will require LSR no matter what else is done.**
- **History indicates that economies of scale produce significant cost/kg advantages for a heavy lifter.**
- **Conclusion: A heavy-lift launch vehicle is, if not strictly mandatory, highly desirable for lunar operations.**

Heavy-Lift Launch Vehicle Concepts


- Numerous HLLV concept designs have been studied by NASA/DoD/Contractor teams for application to Lunar Return, Mars Exploration, and Ballistic Missile Defense applications.

<u>Vehicle/Heritage</u>	<u>LEO Payload</u>
Rebuilt/Upgraded Saturn V:	140+ tonnes
Saturn V derived:	240 tonnes
Shuttle-derived inline:	85 tonnes
Shuttle-derived sidemount:	80 tonnes


Apollo 17/Saturn V Rollout



Saturn V-Derived HLLV and ISS-Derived Habitat Module




Shuttle-Derived Sidemount Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle



Magnum Launch Vehicle - Potential Vehicle Paths


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SDV Path




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Flyback Booster Path



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Clean Sheet Path



Configuration Selection

- Parallel or Series
- Propellant Selection
- Engine Size and Number







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Other Contractor Path

- Lockheed Martin - *Stellaris*
- Microcosm - *Heavy Lift BMDO*
- Truax Engineering - *Excalibur*
- Thiokol - EELV, Atlas, Delta Core w/ Solids

Magnum Launch Vehicle - Inhouse Concept Comparison

SDV and LFBB Pathway Concepts (Note: Cost and Performance Data are Very Preliminary)

	<u>MLV - SDV-1a</u>	<u>MLV - SDV-1b</u>	<u>MLV - SDV-2</u>	<u>MLV - SDV-3</u>	<u>MLV - SDV-4</u>	<u>MLV w/ LFBB</u>	Program Metric
							
Concept Description	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 RSRB's • ET Dia. Core w/ 5 ft. Stretch • 2 Low Press / Low Cost Eng. - 650 Klb Thrust - 416s Isp • Kickstage for Circ. • Shroud w/ 25' x 92' Capacity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4 RSRB's • ET Dia. Core w/ 5 ft. Stretch • 3 Low Press / Low Cost Eng. - 650 Klb Thrust - 416s Isp • Core Airstart @ T+100 sec • Kickstage for Circ. • Shroud w/ 25' x 92' Capacity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 RSRB's • ET Dia. Core w/ 5 ft. Stretch • 2 P/A Modules • 2 SSME per P/A Module • Kickstage for Circ. • Shroud w/ 25' x 92' Capacity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 Pump Fed LRB's • ET Dia. Core w/ 5 ft. Stretch • 2 Low Press / Low Cost Eng. - 650 Klb Thrust - 416s Isp • LOX / RP • - 3 - RD180 per LRB • Kickstage for Circ. • Shroud w/ 25' x 92' Capacity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 Pressure Fed LRB's • ET Dia. Core w/ 5 ft. Stretch • 2 Low Press / Low Cost Eng. - 650 Klb Thrust - 416s Isp • LOX / RP • - 4 - 800K Pr-Fed Eng/LRB • Kickstage for Circ. • Shroud w/ 25' x 92' Capacity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 Liq. Flyback Boosters • ET Dia. Core, no Stretch • 2 Low Press / Low Cost Eng. - 650 Klb Thrust - 416s Isp • LOX / RP, 1.5Mlb each • RD180 type engs, 338s ISP • Kickstage for Circ. • Shroud w/ 25' x 92' Capacity 	
Preliminary Performance (220 x 220 nmi @28°)	120 K	207 K	176 K	201 K	141 K	205 K	175 K
DDT&E Cost	\$1.46B	\$1.46B	\$2.26B	\$2.00B	\$2.41B	\$1.46B No LFBB DDTE	\$1.9B
TFU	\$279M	\$359M	\$294M	\$494M	\$669M	\$225M	N/A
Average Unit Cost (over 25 flights)	\$1917 / lb (\$230M)	\$1488 / lb (\$308M)	\$1347 / lb (\$237M)	\$1761 / lb (\$354M)	\$3553 / lb (\$501M)	\$849 / lb (\$174M)	\$995 / lb LEO (\$176M / Ft.)
GLOW	4.62 Mlb	7.34 Mlb	4.70 Mlb	5.22 Mlb	7.11 Mlb	5.72 Mlb	N/A

What Does All This Cost, and What Might it Cost?

- **It takes a lot of rocket to put a payload in low Earth orbit.**
 - Typically 4-6 pounds of rocket hardware for each pound of satellite.
- **Things tend to cost in proportion to what they weigh.**
- **Things tend to cost inversely according to the number made.**
 - We build at most a few dozen rockets per year, at about \$1000/lb.
- **For an expendable vehicle, all of this expensive hardware gets thrown away after each use!**
- **A reusable system seems intuitively more economical, but an RLV requires even more rocket to put a payload in orbit.**
 - Deorbit, TPS, and landing systems inevitably add mass.
 - While it doesn't get "thrown away", lifetime is still finite, and recurring costs are much higher; e.g. \$16,000/lb for shuttle.
 - Initial development costs, hence amortization of these costs, will also be higher for an RLV.

What Does it Cost? (continued)

- **It takes a long time and many people to prepare and launch a rocket.**
 - **The cost of reliability is very high; that of *unreliability* is even higher.**
 - **The “airline” approach to rocketry remains an elusive goal.**
- **Amortization of development costs is crucial for new vehicles.**
 - **X-15, STS non-recurring costs approximately FY99\$100 K/lb.**
 - **Global flight rates for medium-class payloads (8-25 klbm) estimated to be no more than several dozen/year through 2020.**
 - **Optimistic assumption: ~20 flights/year captured by new vehicle.**
 - **“Cost of Money” mandates that commercial investments for development of a new vehicle must be returned within ~8 years.**
 - **An aggressive four-year development program implies ~4 years of flights to amortize any initial investment.**
 - **30-40% minimum ROI required for “risky” investments.**
- **The price goes up when facility development, insurance, and profit are included.**

Mathematical Model for Cost Analysis

- **Assume the cost of the k-th launch to be composed of expended hardware, propellant, operations, and a share of development costs (Griffin & Claybaugh, 1996):**

$$C_k = C_h + C_p + C_o + C_{dk}$$

where

C_h = cost of expended hardware

C_p = cost of propellant

C_o = cost of launch operations, recovery, refurbishment

C_{dk} = k-th launch share of vehicle development cost

- **Assume costs scale *linearly* with, and depend *only* upon, dry mass M_s .**
 - **Dependence only upon M_s ignores complexity differences between vehicles (level of technology, stage integration, volume effects).**
 - **Linear assumption ignores potentially favorable returns-to-scale.**
- **Insurance and facility development costs neglected, but can be added.**

Nomenclature

M_p = propellant mass

M_s = structural mass

$R \equiv M_s / M_{pL} \equiv$ structural ratio

$\eta = M_p / (M_p + M_s) =$ propellant mass fraction

$c_h =$ specific cost of expended hardware (e.g., \$/lbm)

$c_p =$ specific cost of propellant

$c_L =$ hourly cost of labor (fully burdened)

$c_d =$ specific launch vehicle development cost

$f =$ mass fraction of expended hardware (1 for expendable)

$L =$ labor intensity (man-hours/flight/vehicle-dry-mass)

$g_k =$ development cost amortization fraction for k-th launch

Linear Launch Cost Model

- **Given linear dependence on launch vehicle dry mass M_s , we find:**

$$C_h = c_h f M_s$$

$$C_p = c_p M_p = c_p (M_p/M_s) M_s = c_p [\eta/(1-\eta)] M_s$$

$$C_o = c_L L M_s$$

$$C_d = c_d g_k M_s$$

- **Total cost of k-th launch becomes**

$$C_k = c_h f M_s + c_p [\eta/(1-\eta)] M_s + c_L L M_s + c_d g_k M_s$$

- **Payload specific cost (e.g., cost per pound of payload) for k-th launch becomes**

$$c_k \equiv C_k / M_{PL} = R [c_h f + c_p \eta/(1-\eta) + c_L L + c_d g_k]$$

Structural Ratio

- **Key performance parameter linking structural and propulsion technology with mission requirements (e.g., reference payload and orbit). For a single stage rocket, or an aggregated multistage vehicle with all burns to propellant depletion:**

$$\mathbf{R} \equiv \mathbf{M}_s / \mathbf{M}_{\text{PL}} = (\mathbf{R}^* - 1) / [1 / (1 - \eta) - \mathbf{R}^*] = \mathbf{R}(\eta, \mathbf{I}_{\text{sp}}, \Delta\mathbf{V})$$

where:

- \mathbf{I}_{sp} = specific impulse
- $\mathbf{R}^* = \mathbf{M}_i / \mathbf{M}_f = e^{\Delta\mathbf{V} / g \mathbf{I}_{\text{sp}}} =$ mass ratio
- $\Delta\mathbf{V}$ = ideal velocity-to-be-gained
- \mathbf{M}_i = initial mass
- \mathbf{M}_f = final mass

- **For the j-th stage of an N-stage rocket, $\mathbf{R}_j \equiv \mathbf{M}_{s_j} / \mathbf{M}_{\text{PL}}$, and**

$$\mathbf{R} = 1 + \mathbf{R}_1 \dots + \mathbf{R}_j + \dots + \mathbf{R}_N$$

$$\mathbf{R}_j = [1 + \mathbf{R}_{j+1} / (1 - \eta_{j+1}) + \dots + \mathbf{R}_N / (1 - \eta_N)] (\mathbf{R}_j^* - 1) / [1 / (1 - \eta_j) - \mathbf{R}_j^*]$$

Parameter Ranges for Existing Vehicles*

- **R = 2-6 for expendables,**
- **= 14 for STS,**
- **\cong 10-12 for future single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) RLV,**
- **\cong 5 for future two-stage-to-orbit (TSTO) RLV.**
- **$R\eta/(1-\eta) = 30-80$ for Atlas to STS**
- **L = 4-20 for Atlas, Delta, Titan-4, STS**
- **$c_p = \$0.5 - \$3/\text{lb}$ for lox RP to hypergols; $\cong \$0.25/\text{lb}$ for lox/hydrogen**
- **$c_h \cong \$1000/\text{lb}$ for expendables, \$16,000 for STS orbiter (FY95\$)**
- **$c_L \cong \$100 \text{ K/MY} = \$50/\text{hr}$**
- **f = 1 for expendables, 0.2-0.3 for STS, $\cong 0.005(?)$ for future RLVs**

*Transportation Systems Data Book, NASA-MSFC, DR-8, 2/15/93

ELV Marginal Launch Cost Example

- As a sanity check, let's assume we have an existing fully-amortized vehicle (no development cost payback) with the following characteristics:

$R \cong 5$ (typical two-stage expendable)

$L \cong 4$ (industry best practice)

$c_p \cong \$0.50/\text{lbm}$ (lox/RP)

$c_h \cong \$1000/\text{lb}$ (hardware cost for typical expendable launcher)

$c_L \cong \$50/\text{hr}$

$\eta \cong 0.9$

$f = 1$ (fully expendable)

Then the *marginal* cost of a launch is:

$$C_h/M_{PL} = R c_h f = 5000/\text{lb-payload}$$

$$C_p/M_{PL} = R c_p \eta / (1 - \eta) = 20/\text{lb-payload}$$

$$C_o/M_{PL} = R c_L L = \underline{1000/\text{lb-payload}}$$

$$C/M_{PL} = c \cong \$6000/\text{lb-payload}$$

The Cost of Rocket Hardware - What Might it Be?

- **Expendable rockets cost about \$1000/lb and are made by the dozens.**
- **Airplanes cost \$500-\$1000/lb and are made by the 100s. (About 1300 B-747s exist.)**
- **Boats cost \$50-\$100/lb and are made by the thousands.**
- **Cars cost \$5-\$10/lb and are made by the hundreds of thousands.**
- **Conclusion:**
 - **Volume effects are more important than vehicle type.**
 - **Factor-of-two reduction in c_h for rockets would be a major victory.**
 - **Factor-of ten-cost reduction is needed to retain expendability as an option for deep cuts in launch cost -- how likely is this?**
 - **“Big Dumb Booster” concept is probably named appropriately.**

Operations Costs

- **Currently, $L \cong 10$ MH/flight/lb \Rightarrow industry average**
- **Assume for the sake of argument:**
 - $c = \$1000/\text{lb-payload}$ (desired launch cost)**
 - $c_h = 0 \Rightarrow$ We're assuming the vehicle is free!**
 - $R \cong 5$ (typical expendable; also, reasonable TSTO RLV goal)**
 - $c_L = \$50/\text{hr}$**
 - $R\eta/(1-\eta)c_p = \$20/\text{lb-payload} \Rightarrow$ propellant cost is negligible**
- **Then the launch cost is $RLc_L = \$1000/\text{lb-payload}$, hence we require:**
 - $L < 4$ MH/flight/lb = Current best domestic practice!**
- **A factor-of-ten improvement in c to $\$100/\text{lb}$ would require $L < 0.4$!**
 - **Still assumes a free vehicle.**
 - **$\$20/\text{lb}$ propellant cost not negligible at this level.**
- **Question: Can we work much more efficiently than we do now?**
- **Answer: Maybe.**

Summary of X-15 Operations

- **10 years (1959-1968)**
- **350 people**
- **3 vehicles (plus care and feeding of two B-52s)**
- **199 flights**
- **15,000 lbs (dry)**
- **1 fatality**

- **Thus, $L \cong 0.8$ for the X-15 reusable vehicle program.**
 - **Factor of five better than current U.S. best practice, and on a government program, no less!**

- **Recent data (Claybaugh, 2000) indicate $L \cong 0.8$ also for Ariane**
- **Contrast with $L < 0.001$ for airlines, attained over thousands of flights using vehicles that last for decades.**

RLV Launch Cost Example

- **Assume TSTO RLV design with 40 klbm payload to due East 100 nmi orbit:**

$R = 5$ (Orbital STAS RLV goal; range is 2-6 for TSTO expendables.)

$\eta = 0.9$ (Orbital STAS RLV goal)

$f = 0.005$ (200 flights before replacement)

$L = 1$ mh/flight/lbm (~ 0.8 for X-15, Ariane; Claybaugh, 2000)

$c_d = \$15,000/\text{lbm}$ (average of X-33, X-34; Claybaugh, 2000)

$c_h = \$2,000/\text{lbm}$ (average of X-33, X-34; Claybaugh, 2000)

$c_p = \$0.25/\text{lbm}$ (LOX/LH₂)

$c_L = \$50/\text{hr}$ (burdened labor)

$g_k = 0.0125$ (straight-line amortization, 20 flights/year, 4 years)

(Unreasonably optimistic?)

RLV Launch Cost Example (cont.)

- **Obtain**

$$C_d/M_{PL} = Rg_k c_d = \$940/\text{lb-payload}$$

$$C_h/M_{PL} = Rc_h f = 50/\text{lb-payload}$$

$$C_p/M_{PL} = Rc_p \eta / (1-\eta) = 10/\text{lb-payload}$$

$$C_o/M_{PL} = Rc_L L = \underline{250/\text{lb-payload}}$$

$$C/M_{PL} = c = \$1250/\text{lb-payload} \text{ } (\$310 \text{ marginal cost})$$

- Even with best-case assumptions, operations cost dominates marginal launch cost. $L = 4$ (industry average) gives \$1000/lb-payload *marginal* cost for processing labor alone.
- Hardware replacement costs relatively unimportant *if* X-33/X-34 trends are representative; 100 flight lifetime still gives \$360/lb-payload *marginal* cost.
 - STS recurring cost (~\$16,000/lb) yields \$660/lb-payload marginal cost.
- Development cost amortization dominates early usage. If shuttle processes ($c_d = \$105 \text{ K/lbm}$) are used, $c = \$7000/\text{lb-payload}$ for first 80 flights. Even B777 track record ($c_d = \$25 \text{ K/lbm}$) is prohibitive, with $c = \$1900/\text{lb-payload}$ for first 80 flights.

RLV Cost Example (cont.)

- **Fewer flights or delayed returns over payback period will yield even higher development cost contribution on initial flights.**
 - **But, a sustained program of lunar activity is one of the few things that might generate the requisite number of flights.**
- **Insurance and facility development costs have been omitted.**
- **The above results reflect *cost* only. *Pricing* to allow characteristic ROI for risky ventures (> 30%) can make new RLVs non-competitive against existing expendables, hence commercially un fungible.**
- **Conclusions:**
 - **X-33/X-34 development costs, while favorable compared to earlier systems such as X-15 or shuttle, are probably the acceptable *ceiling* if space launch cost is to be lowered via development of new commercial RLVs. Conventional development paradigms are not an option.**
 - **Government sponsorship is probably required.**
 - **Can we really expect man-rated RLV development at X-33/X-34 prices?**
 - **Even industry best-case operational efficiency is woefully poor.**

HLLV Launch Cost Example

- **Let's now assume an expendable HLLV TSTO design with 200 klbm payload to due East 100 nmi orbit, and consider the marginal cost:**

$R = 1.8$ (Saturn V: $R=1.83$ for Stages 1 & 2, with 100 ton Skylab.)

$\eta = 0.93$ (Saturn V: $\eta_1 = 0.94, \eta_2 = 0.93$)

$f = 1$

$L = 1$ mh/flight/lbm (same goal as for RLV example)

$c_d = 0$ (Government sponsored development, no amortization.)

$c_h = \$500/\text{lbm}$ (Factor of two improvement over present practice.)

$c_p = \$0.25/\text{lbm}$ (LOX/LH₂; LOX/RP-1 is even cheaper.)

$c_L = \$50/\text{hr}$ (burdened labor)

$g_k = 0$

HLLV Launch Cost Example (cont.)

- **Obtain**

$$C_h/M_{PL} = Rc_h f = \$900/\text{lb-payload}$$

$$C_p/M_{PL} = Rc_p \eta / (1-\eta) = 6/\text{lb-payload}$$

$$C_o/M_{PL} = Rc_L L = \underline{250/\text{lb-payload}}$$

$$C/M_{PL} = c = \$1156/\text{lb-payload}$$

- **Better than Saturn V mostly because of hardware production assumptions.**
- **Comparable to commercially-developed RLV with optimistic amortization model.**
 - **But not nearly as good as a fully-amortized RLV, such as might be assumed for a high-traffic lunar enterprise model.**
- **Even with favorable assumptions on production cost, and ignoring development cost, the cost of expended hardware dominates.**
 - **But only if we can get operations efficiency on par with X-15, Ariane.**
- **Conclusion: Expendable HLLV best for early, low-traffic lunar return.**
 - **RLV favored in the context of a high-traffic (e.g., 20+ launches/year) model.**