


FIG. 3.8. Leakage mechanisms identified for Westinghouse fuel [3.2, 3.19]. (a) Fuel fabricated after 1983; (b) fuel fabricated after 1987.


TABLE 3.7. GE 8 × 8 FUEL FAILURE EXPERIENCE UP TO AUGUST 1993 (NUMBER OF FAILED ASSEMBLIES) [3.20]

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
PCI														
Non-barrier	8	4	4	12	9	4	16	7	13	1	2	0	0	2
Barrier	—	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CILC														
Conventional	7	67	55	47	79	41	22	16	42	13	4	1	0	0
Corrosion Improved	—	—	—	—	0	0	0	0	0	45 <sup>a</sup>	0	0	0	0
Debris fretting	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	0	3	0	2	13	4	2
Manufacturing defects	1	0	0	1	2	0	2	1	6	10	7	6	7	2
Unknown											1			6
<i>Total</i>	18	72	61	62	92	45	41	24	64	69	16	20	11	12

<sup>a</sup> Severe chemical intrusion event at one US reactor.




BWRs 1987-1990




BWRs 1991-1994

- Debris fretting
- PCI
- Manufacturing
- CILC
- Others
- Unknown




PWRs 1987-1990




PWRs 1991-1994

- Debris fretting
- Grid-rod fretting
- Manufacturing
- Baffle jetting
- Others
- Unknown



CANDUs up to 1991



CANDUs 1991-1994

- Debris fretting
- SCC
- Manufacturing and unassigned
- Excess hydrogen

FIG. 3.10. Estimated world distribution of fuel failure causes.


**Table 1**  
**GE Fuel Experience**  
**May 1974 through October 1996**

	<u>Non-Barrier</u>	<u>Barrier</u>
Fuel Operated		
Initial Cores	28	7
Reloads	226	232
Bundles	45,361	43,881
Fuel Rods	2,804,833	2,752,942
Lead Exposure, GWd/MTU		
Batch Average	36.0	43.5
Bundle Average	45.6	45.5
Rod Average	50.2	65.0
Fuel Rods Completed $\geq$ 1 Cycle	2,785,281	2,358,786

**Table 2**  
**GE BWR Fuel Experience**  
**Manufactured After January 1, 1989 (through October 1996)**

Fuel Operated	
Initial Cores	3
Reloads	155
Bundles	26,835
Fuel Rods	1,708,518
Lead Exposure, GWd/MTU	
Batch Average	42.2
Bundle Average	43.6
Rod Average	48.0
Fuel Rods Completed $\geq$ 1 Cycle	1,333,250
Fuel Rod Failures	
Debris Fretting	8
Undetected Fabrication Defects	8
Uninspected	6

**Figure 1**  
**GE Fuel Performance Experience**



$\mu\text{Ci I-131/gm, Median Value}$




Figure 2: Westinghouse fuel reliability compared to industry averages.




Figure 2. Rod D1 at EC Flaw Location Showing Cracks in Cladding Arcs Subtended by Missing Fuel Surface

## Detection of Fuel Failures

Generally, the detection of 3 families of radioisotopes tells a lot about the nature of the failure.

Family	Radioisotopes	Insight
Noble Gases	$^{133}\text{Xe}$ , $^{133\text{m}}\text{Xe}$ , $^{135}\text{Xe}$ , $^{138}\text{Xe}$ , $^{85\text{m}}\text{Kr}$ , $^{88}\text{Kr}$	Helps identify leak character or size
Iodine	$^{131}\text{I}$ , $^{132}\text{I}$ , $^{133}\text{I}$ , $^{134}\text{I}$ , $^{135}\text{I}$	I is trapped between fuel and cladding-only released if water enters gap
Cesium	$^{134}\text{Cs}$ , $^{137}\text{Cs}$	Indicates fuel dissolution and BU level in leaking fuel. $^{134}\text{Cs} \propto \text{BU}$ , $^{137}\text{Cs} \propto (\text{BU})^2$






FIG. 4.3.  $^{134}\text{Cs}/^{137}\text{Cs}$  activity ratio versus burnup.

## **Current Areas of R & D Focus**

### **General**

#### **1.) Fuel and Cladding Material Properties at High Burnup**

**(Concern here is for transient conditions)**

- **Thermal diffusivity is different (lab vs in-reactor)**
- **Cladding ductility shows wide scatter due to H<sub>2</sub> concentration, sample preparation, and measurement techniques**
- **Must understand in-reactor behavior**

#### **2.) Failure Root cause Investigation**

**(To achieve zero defects, must understand causes)**

- **Poolside inspections valuable for identification**
- **Expensive hotcell studies done only if poolside investigation does not work**

#### **3.) Updated Codes and Analytical Tools**

**(Especially important for high BU in PWR's)**

- **Gadolinia absorbers, local boiling, effect of boiling on flow properties**
- **Integrated nuclear and thermal hydraulic codes**

## **Current Areas of R & D Focus (cont.)**

### **4.) Transient Fuel Behavior**

**(Controversy over reactor-initiated accidents [RIA])**

- **All parties (regulators, utilities, and vendors) agree that simulated conditions are much more severe than reality**
- **Particularly interested in post-LOCA and post-DNB conditions**
- **Difficult to conduct meaningful experiments**

### **5.) Next Generation Fuel**

**(Concern here is to increase reliability and operational flexibility)**

- **New fuel designs and materials**
- **>60 GWd/T burnup, load following, extended cycle time**
- **Water chemistry changes**

## Current Areas of R & D Focus (cont.)

### PWR Specific

#### 1.) Cladding Corrosion

*(Plant surveillance shows that cladding corrosion is limiting further BU extension)*

#### 2.) Water Chemistry Control

- Codes are now available to predict corrosion rate as a function of:

heat flux  
coolant temperature  
neutron fluence  
cladding hydrogen content  
cladding intermetallic particles  
heat treatment  
coolant Li concentration

- Recommendation is to raise pH and reduce source of crud

(requires 30% enriched  $^{10}\text{B}$  to keep Li concentration < 3 ppm)

## **Current Areas of R & D Focus (cont.)**

### **BWR Specific**

- 1.) Finding cladding barrier that is resistant to PCI failures**
- 2.) Reduce "fuel washout" from failed fuel**